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NOTES
be expanded so as to be quite liberal toward the buyer it is also
modified by refusing to permit recovery to the buyer unless he
can show that the loss could not have reasonably been prevented
on his part by covering. The section as a whole seems indispen-
sable to provide adequate relief to both the buyer and the seller,
and to offer them maximum protection against the injustice arising
out of complicated present-day market conditions.
In attempting to codify any commercial law writers have a
difficult task. If a tendency is made to use over-specific term-
inology the adopted commercial law will soon be antiquated by
changing business situations. On the other hand, if the writers
generalize, much too broad an interpretation will be left up to the
courts.36 The drafters of the UCC have attempted to attain the
middle road between the two above situations. This policy, how-
ever, has drawn fire from the critics, who contend that the drafters
have not carried the simplicity to a desirable point, and that it still
retains many of the abstract words and phrases of the Uniform
Sales Act. Yet it would seem that over-simplification would result
in exacting remedies from which obvious injustice would arise.
While the code is by no means an ideal solution to all of the
problems surrounding the buyer where there has been a breach by
the seller, it offers him a greater variety of remedies from which he
can choose to place himself in a position nearer to the one in which
he would have been had the contract not been breached. In view
of the economic changes brought about by our advancing civiliza-
tion, the UCC, if adopted, will render an improvement over the
existing law of North Dakota which furnishes remedies to a buyer.
DOUGLAS L. DUNAHAY
CHARLES A. FESTE.
THE POSITION OF THE BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.- The pro-
posed Uniform Commercial Code, in dealing with bona fide pur-
chasers of personal property, has basically retained the law as it
exists under the laws of North Dakota and the Uniform Sales Act.
The North Dakota code states that where goods are sold by a person
not the owner thereof, who does not sell them under the authority
or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title
to the goods than the Seller had; an exception is made where the
36. 57 Yale L.J. 1360 (1948).
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owner of the goods, by his conduct, is precluded from denying
the seller's authority to sell., Thus a bona fide purchaser of personal
property taken tortiously or wrongfully, as the trespass or theft,
does not acquire a title good against the true owner. 2
The coincident UCC section states that a purchaser of goods
acquires all title which his transferor has or has power to transfer,
but where goods are put in the hands of a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind, the merchant can transfer good title to a buyer
"in the ordinary course of business."' Thus the only change in the
present law would be the removal of the estoppel prerequisite in
order to permit a buyer to be classified as a bona fide purchaser
where he purchases "in the ordinary course of business."4 At pres-
ent under the Sales Act, the mere possession of goods by a person
who habitually deals in such goods is not sufficient to defeat the
owner's claim against a good faith purchaser of the goods.5 For ex-
ample, under present law one who innocently purchased a diamond
fom a jeweler in whose care it had been placed for the purpose
of appraisal would acquire no better title to the stone than that
possessed by the jeweler. ' This protection of the owner's title is
given as against the contentions that estoppel is present, or that
apparent authority or an agency relationship give the wrongful
vendor authority to sell.7
Conversely, under the UCC, since the jeweler would be acting
in the usual course of business the sale would be held valid as
passing title to an innocent purchaser for value. In taking this point
of view the UCC has apparently codified the common law rule
expressed in the early case of Pickering v. Busk:" "If the principal
send his commodity to a place, where it is the ordinary business of
the person to whom it is confided to to sell, it must be intended that
the commodity was sent thither for the purpose of sale."
By definition under the UCC the rules protecting one who
buys goods in the ordinary course of business are not applicable to
one who buys from a pawnbroker, or a person buying from a
farmer." Likewise, buying in "the ordinary course of business"
1. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-0124 (1) (1943).
2. See, e.g., Seigal v. Warrick, 214 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (corn entrusted
to agent who sold to innocent purchaser).
3 . U.C.C. § 2-403 (1) (2).
4. U.C.C. J 1-201 (9).
5. Moore v. Long, 250 Ala. 47, 33 So.2d 6 (1947); cf. Barthelmess v. Cavalier, 2 Cal.
App.2d 477, 38 P.2d. 484 (1934); Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305 (1882).
6. Green v. Wachs, 254 N.Y. 437, 173 N.E. 575 (1930).
7. For a discussion on this point see 2 Williston, Sales § 313 (Rev. ed. 1948).
8. 15 East 38, 13 Eng. Rep. 364 (1812).
9. U.C.C. J 1-201 (9).
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does not include a transfer in bulk or the obtaining of security in
satisfaction of a money debt.'0
A second basic change made by the Code is in its treatment of
the problem of a buyer who gives a bad check in payment for
goods. The North Dakota Supreme Court has not dealt with this,
problem'under our present statutes. However, other states which
have adopted the Uniform Sales Act have held that the check is
conditional payment and no title passes from seller to buyer. Con-
sequently, no title can pass from the buyer to a good faith pur-
chaser." The courts employ the fiction that the sale is for cash and
since the dishonor of the check precludes payment of the money, no
title passes. -1 2 The UCC alters this rule by providing that no agree-
ment that a contract for sale is a "cash sale" alters the effects of
identification of goods to the contract or impairs the rights of good
faith purchasers for value. 1 This provision of the Code is appar-
ently designed to eliminate the problems surrounding the "cash
sale" theory and to afford additional protection to bona fide pur-
chasers for value.
Summarizing, it can be seen that under the Sales Act where a
check is given in payment for goods no title passes until the check
is honored. The Code takes the opposite view, stating that title
passes immediately, although the title may be voidable. The holder
of the voidable title can then pass on a good title to a good
faith purchaser for value, 4 for a reasonable time after acquisition
or until the title has been avoided. 15
Another section of the Code'6 makes a check conditional pay-
ment as between the parties to the instrument. Therefore the check
would be defeated by dishonor on presentment. Apparently this
provision would make the vendee liable to the vendor for the value
of the goods instead of to the bona fide purchaser, but its remedy
10. See note 9, supra.
11. Clark v. Hamilton Diamond Co., 209 Cal. 1, 284 Pac. 915 (1930); National Bank
of Commerce v. Chicago B&N, R. Co., 44 Minn. 224, 46 N.W. 342 (1890); John S.
Hale Co. v. Beley, 154 Tenn. 689, 290 S.W. 994 (1927).
12. For criticism of this view see 2 Williston, Sales j 346 (a) (Rev. ed. 1948).
13. U.C.C. 1 2-401 (1) (b).
14. U.C.C. § 2-403' (1).
15. Ava Hardware Co. v. Christensen, 122 S.W.2d 92 (Mo..App. 1938); Parr v.
Helfrich, 108 Neb. 801, 189 N.W. 281 (1922).
16. U.C.C. § 2-511 (3).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
would seem to offer very little consolation, since makers of worth-
less checks are traditionally insolvent.
RAYMOND M. HAGEN
ROBERT L. MCCONN
ORALL B. JOHNSON.
THE TREATMENT OF WARRANTY PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE
SALE OF GOODS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. - Among
the many areas of the law in which the Uniform Commercial Code
will work substantial changes must be listed those sections of it
which deal with the problems arising from warranties. It has long
been recognized that the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act
regulating these questions are in need of adjustment and overhaul.,
In general, the Uniform Commercial Code undertakes this difficult
task with effectiveness and insight, and a comparison of its pro-
visions with the present law of North Dakota will indicate at once
how much improvement has been made.
I.
The first major provision of the Uniform Commercial Code
dealing with warranties is §2-313, which undertakes to prescribe
the situations in which express warranties of quality or otherwise
will be read into a contract of sale. Section 2-313 introduces two
significant changes in existing law. Under this section, for instance;
"any description of the goods which is made a basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that goods shall conform..." This
broadens the Uniform Sales Act, which provides that an express
warranty is created only if the "natural tendency ... is to induce
the buyer to purchase."2 Another change would be effected in re-
gard to a sale by sample and description; the UCC provides that
such a sale creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform thereto, while the North Dakota Code provides
that an implied warranty is thereby created.' The purpose of the
latter change could well be to make the warranty effective despite
a possible disclaimer clause elsewhere in the contract.
Two significant modifications of existing law would also be
1. See Note, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 173 (1950).
2. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-0113 (1943). See also Nielson v. Hermanson, 109 Utah 180,
166 P.2d 536 (1946); Teter v. Schultz, 110 Ind. App. 541, 39 N.E.2d 802 (1942);
Letnz v. Omar Baking Co., 125 Neb. 861, 252 N.W. 410 (1934); Glaspey v. Wool
Grower's Service Corp., 151 Wash. 683, 277 Pac. 70 (1929).'
3. N.D. Rev. Code § 51-0115 (7) (1943).
